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NOTES AND COMMENTS
CONFLICT OF LAWS
INAPPLICABILITY OF ERIE v. TOMPKINS TO SUITS IN WHICH
THE UNITED STATES IS DRAWEE OF A CHECK
In April, 1936, a W.P.A. check was drawn on the Treasurer
of the United States to the order of Clair Barner and mailed to him.
Barner never received the check. An unknown per;on obtained it
and, representing himself to be Barner, endorsed it to the J. C. Penney
Co. of Clearfield, Pennsylvania which company in turn endorsed it
to the defendant. Defendant then endorsed the check "Prior En-
dorsements Guaranteed" and collected it from the United States. The
forgery was unknown to the government until November 1936. No
notice was given to the defendant until January 1937 and the govern-
ment did not ask for reimbursement until August 1937. The district
court held that the rights of the parties were governed by Pennsyl-
vania law which barred the United States from recovery because of
the delay., The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.2 Held, affirmed;
federal law governs the rights of the parties. Clearfield Trust Co. et
al. v. United States, 63 Sup. Ct. 573 (1943).
Since Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 3 litigants in federal courts because
of diversity of citizenship, have their rights determined by the law
of the state in which the federal court sits. So far the doctrine has not
been extended beyond diversity cases.4
In the instant case diversity of citizenship was not involved.
Suit was brought by the government under a federal statute5 ; the
check issued was for payment of services rendered under a federal
1. See note 13 infra.
2. United States v. Clearfield Trust Co., 130 F.(2d) 93 (C.C.A. 2d,
1942).
3. 304 U.S. 64 (1937). That case coming like a "bolt from the
blue" overturned the reign of Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1 (U.S.
1842) which had prevailed for almost a century. Cook, "Federal
Courts and Conflicts of Laws" (1941) 36 Ill. L.R,3v. 493. Notes
(1938) 22 Minn. L. Rev. 885, (1938) 86 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 896,
(1938) 7 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 257.
4. No cases have been found where the doctrine has been extended
beyond diversity cases. Federal jurisdiction exists in diversity
cases to insure non-resident parties of an impartial tribunal. See
Marshall, C.J., in Bank of United States v. Devfaux, 5 Cranch
61, 87 (U.S. 1809). Because of this it seems just that the fed-
eral courts should not be allowed to declare a "hybrid" law gov-
erning litigants in federal courts who are there solely because
of diversity of citizenship, no federal question being involved.
See Justice Jackson, concurring in D'Oench, Dulume and Co. v.
F.D.I.C., 315 U.S. 447, 466 (1942); United States v. Clearfield
Trust Co., 130 F.(2d) 93 (C.C.A. 2d, 1942) where3 it is pointed
out that the Erie R.R. v. Tompkins rule is probably limited to
diversity cases.
5. 36 Stat. 1087 (1911), 28 U.S.C.A. §41 (1) (1941).
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statute;6 the forgery of the payee's signature was a crime against
the United States.7
There have been numerous situations in federal courts where,
although there was no constitutional provision or federal statute
directly in point, the federal courts still did not apply the state law.8
Thus, questions relating to national banks have been decided under
"general doctrine" and state decisions have been held inapplicable.9
Litigation affecting Indiana, in the absence of applicable federal
statutes have been decided under "general" federal law.10 The same
result has been reached in condemnation proceedings." Where the
United States is a contracting party the majority of the decisions
also hold that the Erie v. Tompkins doctrine is inapplicable. 2 It
appears, therefore, that the court was adhering to the settled course
of decisions in rejecting Pennsylvania law and adhering to federal law.
Under Pennsylvania law, the United States would have failed in
this action since in that jurisdiction the burden is on the drawee to
give prompt notice of the forgery, injury to the endorser being con-
clusively presumed from the mere fact of delay.1s Under the law
6. 48 Stat. 55-58 (1934), 15 U.S.C.A. 721-728 (1941) (The Federal
Emergency Relief Act).
7. Alvarado v. United States, 9 F.(2d) 385 (C.C.A. 9th, 1925);
Hamil v. United States, 298 Fed. 369 (C.C.A. 5th, 1924).
8. Although Justice Brandeis in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.
64, 78 (1937) said, "There is no federal common law," in an-
other opinion delivered by him on the same day he said " . . .
whether the water of an interstate stream must be apportioned
• . . is a matter of federal common law upon which neither
statutes nor decisions of either state can be conclusive." Hen-
derlider v. La Plata Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1937). What was
meant by this statement is that federal courts have to apply state
law in diversity cases except where the constitution, treaties or stat-
utes of the United States are binding. Alamedo Co. v. United
States, 124 F. (2d) 611 (C.C.A. 9th, 1941). Where a federal
question arises, the federal courts can still delve into the com-
mon law and their own decisions as a backlog or source authority.
See Justice Jackson concurring in D'Oench, Duhme and Co. v.
F.D.I.C., 315 U.S. 447, 466 (1942), cited supra note 4.
9. McCarty v. Gault, 24 F. Supp. 977 (D.C. Oregon 1938); Die-
trick v. Greaney, 309 U.S. 190 (1939).. The doctrine is followed
for liabilities under F.D.I.C. D'Oench, Duhme and Co. v. F.D.I.C.,
315 U.S. 447 (1942). See Notes (1942) 28 Va. L. Rev. 821,
(1942) 4 Ga. Bar J. 405, (1942) 26 Minn. L. Rev. 899.
10. Board of Comm. v. United States, 308 U.S. 343 (1939); United
States v. Osage County, 251 U.S. 128 (1919).
11. Kole v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875); United States v.
Indian Creek Marble Co., 40 F. Supp. 811 (E. D. Tenn. 1941).
12. Royal Indemnity Co. v. United States, 313 U.S. 289 (1941);
Kolker v. United States, 40 F. Supp. 972 (N.D. Md. 1941); United
States v. Grogen, 39 F. Supp. 819 (D.C. Mont. 1941); Byron Jackson
Co. v. United States, 35 F. Supp. 665 (S.D. Cal. 1940). Contra: Ala-
medo Co. v. United States, 124 F. (2d) 611 (C.C.A. 9th, 1941);
United States v. Brookridge, 111 F. (2d) 461 (C.C.A. 10th, 1940).
13. Market Street Title Co. v. Chelten Trust Co., 196 Pa. 230, 145
Atl. 848 (1929); McNeely Co. v. Bank of N. America, 221 Pa.
588, 70 At. 891 (1908); Marks v. Anchor Savings Bank, 252
Pa. 304, 97 Atl. 339 (1916); State v. First National Bank, 203
Pa. 69,.52 Ati. 13 (1902).
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as applied in the federal courts, however, it is consistntly held that
the cause of action for recovery of money paid as a result of the
forgery accrues immediately upon payment, and notice of the forgery
is not a condition precedent to suit against the indcrser.14  While
unexplained delay or even inexcusable carelessness in not giving
notice is not a bar to bringing the action, if the indorser has been
injured by the drawee's failure to give notice this will be a complete
defense to the suit. 5 No such injury was proved in this case.
Recovery by the drawee from the indorsee of a forged negotiable
instrument has been allowed upon two theories-breach of warranty 6
14. United States v. Nat'l Exchange Bank, 214 U.S, 302 (1908);
Leather Manufacturers Bank v. Merchants Bank, 128 U.S. 26
(1888); Fed. Reserve Bank v. Atlanta Trust Co., 91 F. (2d) 283
(C.C.A. 5th, 1937); Fourth National Bank v. Gainesville Bank,
80 F. (2d) 49 (C.C.A. 5th, 1935); United States v. City Savings
Bank, 73 F. (2d) 486 (C.C.A. 6th, 1934); Ladd v. United States,
30 F. (2d) 334 (C.C.A. 9th, 1929); United StatEs v. National
Bank of Republic, 141 Fed. 208 (C.C.D. Mass. 1902); United States
v. National Exchange Bank of Boston, 141 Fed, 209 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1902); United States v. National City Bank, 28 F. Supp.
144 (S.D.N.Y. 1939). See Note (1938) 47 Yale L.J. 827. Contra:
United States v. Central National Bank, 6 Fed. 134 (E.D.Pa
1881).
15. Ladd v. United States, 30 F. (2d) 334 (C.C.A. 9th, 1929);
United States v. National Bank of Republic, 141 Fed. 208 (C.
C.D. Mass. 1902); United States v. National City Bank, 28 F.
Supp. 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1939); United States v. National Rockland
Bank, 35 F. Supp. 912 (D.C. Mass. 1910). The fact that thel
drawee was the United States would have been no defense if
actual damage had been caused by the delay. Although Justice
Story made the general assertion that laches were never im-
putable to the government, "not because of any notions of sov-
ereignty but because the government has to act through agents
and can not be expected to act on time." United States v. Kirk-
patrick, 9 Wheat. 720 (U.S. 1824), and this general language was
followed in United States v. Thompson, 98 U.S. 486 (1878), this
is not the law today. While laches are not imputable to the
United States when it is asserting a sovereign or governmental
right, United States v. Minnesota, 270 U.S. 181 (1925); Utah
Power and Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 409 (1916), when
the government enters the domain of commerce ir. assumes all
the responsibilities and submits itself to the same law that
governs private individuals. United States v. National Exchange
Bank, 270 U.S. 535 (1926); Cook et al. v. United States, 91 U.S.
389 (1875); United States v. National Exchange Bank of Balti-
more, 1 F. (2d) 888 (C.C.A. 4th, 1924); United States v. Na-
tional City Bank, 28 F. Supp. 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
16. At the time the defendant received this check the payee's sig-
nature had been forged. The defendant endorsed the check
over to the Fed. Reserve Bank "Prior Endorsements Guaranteed."
A party that transfers a check by endorsement warrants that the
instrument is genuine and is liable upon the warranty if any
of the names are forged. United States v. National Exchange
Bank, 214 U.S. 302 (1908); Fed. Reserve Bank v. Atlanta Trust
Co., 91 F. (2d) 283 (C.C.A. 5th, 1937); Farmers State Bank
v. United States, 62 F. (2d) 178 (C.C.A. 5th, 1932); Ladd and
Tildon Bank v. United States, 30 F. (2d) 334 (C.C.A. 9th, 1929);
U.S. v. Onondago Co. Savings Bank, 39 Fed. 259 (N.D.N.Y.
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and recovery in quasi-contract.17 While the weight of authority seems
to follow the warranty theory,18 the Supreme Court was not required
to choose in the instant case, since the United States could recover
under either theory.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
JONES v. CITY OF OPELIKA OVERRULED
Petitioners, Jehovah's Witnesses, went from door to door soliciting
people to purchase religious books and pamphlets. The city of Jean-
nette, Pennsylvania, filed a complaint charging petitioners with failure
to obtain a license as required by an ordinance. The lower court
found them guilty and the Pennsylvania court of appeal affirmed
the decision. Held, the ordinance is invalid as abridging the free-
dom of religion. Murdock v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 63 Sup.
Ct. 870 (1943). (Justices Jackson [at p. 882], Frankfurter [at p.
899], Roberts [at p. 899], and Reed [at p. 891] dissenting).
The Constitution declares that "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exer-
cise thereof." U.S. Const. Amend. I. These religious guaranties are
limitations only on the federal government and do not protect the
religious liberties of the people against state governments, unless the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment includes protection
of religious liberty. Willis, "Constitutional Law" (1936) 502. De-
cisions of the United States Supreme Court hold that such is the case.
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940); see Schneider v.
State, 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939); cf. Hamilton v. Regents of University
of California, 293 U.S. 245 (1935).
The tax imposed by the Jeannette city ordinance is a flat license
tax and is a condition precedent to the exercise of the constitutional
privileges. The power to tax the exercise of a privilege is the power
to control or suppress its enjoyment. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292
U.S. 40 (1934). Therefore, unless the Jeannette city ordinance can
1889); Bergam v. Avenue State Bank, 248 Ill. App. 516, 1 N.E.
(2d) 432 (1936); Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Harriman Na-
tional Bank, 237 App. Div. 401, 262 N.Y. Supp. 483 (1932) ; General
Fire Assurance Co. v. State, 177 App. Div. 745, 164 N.Y. Supp.
871 (1917); Oriental Bank v. Gallo, 112 App. Div. 360, 98 N.Y.Supp.
561 (1906). Dean Ames has challenged this theory of recovery,
"The Doctrine of Price v. Neal" (1891) 4 Harv. L. Rev. 297.
See Kessler, "Forged Instruments" (1938) 47 Yale L.J. 873.
17. Recovery is allowed under this doctrine for mutual mistake of
fact as to the genuineness of the signature of the payee. United
States National Park Bank of New York, Fed. 852 (S.D. N.Y.
1881); First National Bank of Minnesota v. City National Bank
of Holyoke, 182 Mass. 130, 65 N.E. 24 (1902); Welch v. Goodwin,
123 Mass. 71, 25 Am. Rep. 24 (1878); Merchants National Bank
v. National Bank of Commonwealth, 139 Mass. 513, 2 N.E. 89(1885). Some courts use the terms, warranty and quasi-contract,
indiscriminately when allowing recovery and are not clear upon
which basis recovery is allowed. New York Produce Exchange
Bank v. 12th Ward Bank, 135 App. Div. 521, 19 N.Y. Supp. 988(1909); City Bank v. National Bank, 45 Texas 213 (1876).
18. See note 16 supra.
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